In this paper I try to show that Heidegger develops in Being and Time an ethics of the authenticity, which doesn´t consist in the prescription of rules of action, but in a certain attitude, which the Dasein has to adopt toward his own mortality. In relation to this aim I will consider the problems of the state of Verfallenheit, the anxiety and the death as an own possibility. These themes are analyzed from the point of view of the dichotomy that (...) Heidegger establishes between the authentic existence and the unauthentic existence. (shrink)

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En este trabajo intento mostrar que existen diferencias importantes entre las concepciones del Estado de Hermann Cohen y de Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Por lo tanto, concluyo que la tesis de la influencia de la filosofía fichteana en la teoría de Cohen es problemática. In this paper I try to show that there are important differences between Hermann Cohen's and Johann Gottlieb Fichte's conceptions of the state. Therefore I conclude that the thesis of the influence of the Fichtean philosophy upon Cohen's (...) theory is problematic. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn this paper, I intend to reconstruct the main points of Taylor’s politics of recognition, starting from the debate about negative and positive liberties. Then, I will focus on the role of the ideal of authenticity in this conception of freedom, as well as on the dialogical conception of the self. Furthermore, I will develop the political consequences of these ideas. In addition to examining McBride's argument about the oppressive character of recognition, I will also address Fraser's objection concerning the (...) sectarian character of Taylor's theory. Furthermore, I also consider Ikäheimo's criticisms in respect to the problem of integration between the horizontal and vertical forms of recognition, the issue of affirmative action, and the idea of a passive subjectivity. Finally, I will centre on Axel Honneth's criticisms to Taylor's idea of recognition in terms of its lack of clarity. (shrink)

The Fichtean theory of self-consciousness and recognition, published in 1796 and 1797, must be understood in terms of the mutual formation of subjects insofar as they are rational and free beings. It is for this reason that this paper criticizes Stephen Darwall´s interpretation from the second person´s perspective. It also reconstructs the Fichtean theory of family, suggesting evidence of the relationships of recognition that structure it. In this way there are analogies between the original situation of summons and the formative (...) relationships at the core of the family community. (shrink)

En este trabajo intento mostrar, contra la tesis de D. James, que existe una relación de continuidad entre la teoría del derecho internacional del Fundamento del derecho natural y de El Estado comercial cerrado de Johann G. Fichte, basándome en dos razones. En primer lugar, en ambos textos la propiedad de los ciudadanos puede ser garantizada sólo si el Estado es soberano en relación con los demás para planificar su propia política económica. En segundo lugar, si bien en El Estado (...) comercial cerrado se restringen las relaciones comerciales entre los ciudadanos, también quedan abiertos otros tipos de relación entre los ciudadanos de diferentes Estados. (A). (shrink)

Knauss, Stefan. Von der Conquista zur Responsibility while Protecting. Die Debatte zur humanitär gerechtfertigten Kriegsführung aus lateinamerikanischer Perspektive. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2016. 274 pp.

This paper aims to explore conceptual relationships between philosophical developments to support freedom of speech in John Milton´s Areopagitica and Johann Gottlieb Fichte´s Reclamation of the Freedom of Thought. I intend to enhance the philosophical heritance collected and recreated by Fichte. This paper hypothesizes that both theories state that freedom of speech is a condition for the development of morality. In both cases, moral deliberation has a public character, given that moral judgment needs the consideration of different viewpoints about the (...) question at stake. Finally, in both cases, it is defended a republican concept of power, characterized by opposition to moral paternalism, as a form of despotism. (shrink)

The philosophy of history of 1804 and 1805 enables Fichte to place his natural right, developed previously at Jena, against a diachronic background. This means that Fichte does not reason merely synchronically from a timeless conception of society and state. From a synchronic viewpoint, Fichte cannot solve the problem of the control of political power because he has to draw on the assumption of a virtuous ephorate. This assumption is not consistent with the Fichtean ideal of a philosophy of right (...) completely independent from moral considerations. Thus, the control of government is possible only if at least a group of citizens can go beyond the mere rational egoism. This new temporal conception of the state leads Fichte to think that the problems of consistency of his theory of Jena are unavoidable, given that a society integrated by egoist individuals cannot be sustained. However, his later philosophy of history enables Fichte to state the inexorable annihilation of this type of community and gives place to an ensuing epoch, when citizens are not self-interested anymore. (shrink)

El rol de la intersubjetividad en la constitución de la autoconciencia -- La estructura de la relación legal -- La teoría del Estado -- El rol de la corporalidad del individuo en a fundamentación del sistema legal -- El derecho a la existencia.

En este trabajo se discute la interpretación de Isaiah Berlin de la filosofía política fichteana en términos de un organicismo. Esta interpretación muestra que las libertades individuales juegan un rol fundamental en la educación de los ciudadanos futuros en tanto que ésta es una tarea realizada por los padres y no por el Estado. Sin embargo, Fichte no defiende una idea de la libertad individual como no-interferencia, aun cuando las similitudes entre su teoría y la de Humboldt sugieran lo contrario. (...) Del mismo modo, Fichte no defendió tampoco la idea de la libertad como no-dominación, como revela la comparación con la teoría de Philip Pettit. Por el contrario, Fichte sostuvo que la educación de los futuros ciudadanos tiene sentido únicamente cuando las libertades individuales son consideradas como inextricablemente unidas con la propiedad. This paper discusses Isaiah Berlin’s interpretation of Fichtean political philosophy in terms of organicism. It shows that individual liberties play a fundamental role in the education of future citizens as a task performed by parents, not the state. However, Fichte did not defend an idea of individual liberty or non-interference, even if similarities between his theory and Humboldt’s suggest the contrary. At the same time, Fichte also did not espouse the idea of freedom as non-domination, as a comparison with Philip Pettit’s theory reveals. By contrast, Fichte posited that the education of future citizens makes sense only if individual liberties are considered inextricably linked to property. (shrink)

In this paper I try to reconstruct the arguments developed by Fichte in his work Foundations of Natural Right (1796/1797), in order to support the necessity of a recognition of capabilites and rights by the other, so that the I can constitute itself as a self-consciousness. I also take into account the criticisms the Fichtean theory has received by many contemporary interpreters, testing its consistency in the light of these arguments.

Este volumen colectivo, editado por Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Paula Satne y Larry Krasnoff, constituye un aporte sustancial al estudio de la filosofía kantiana del derecho. Dadas las limitaciones de espacio, podré detenerme brevemente únicamente en algunas de las contribuciones que enriquecen el volumen, si bien todas son muy valiosas y originales.

Commentaries on the Guide of the Perplexed occupy a central but neglected place in the history of Jewish thought. In the first study on the subject, Igor De Souza examines this dynamic tradition in its most creative period. Rather than mere interpretation, De Souza reads commentaries as texts in their own right. At the same time, he illustrates how texts are reimagined through commentary, and repurposed for new generations of readers.

Povijest je u Hölderlina shvaćena kao usud kroz koji se duh odašilje iz svojega prvotnog sjedinjenja u svoju razdvojenost. Unutar jedinstvenog povijesnog usuda razlikuju se osobito grčki i hesperijski usud, koji su međusobno bitno povezani. Posebni se usud dosuđuje prema određenom zakonu usuda, s obzirom na svrhu povijesti, tj. udaljenost i blizinu određenog povijesnog razdoblja od iskona povijesti. Povijest je u svojim pojedinačnim likovima razvoj samog iskona. Prikazujući se u povijesti, iskon se skriva u svojoj beskonačnosti i neiscrpnosti, sve dok (...) se u povijesnim prevratima ne očituju kao takav, nakon čega se opet oblikuje jedan novi povijesni svijet, novo posebno uzajamno djelovanje prirode i umijeća.Jedinstvo iskona ne obnavlja se kao povratak u neposrednost prvoga stanja. Ono nije puko ponavljanje prvoga jedinstva, nego takvo stanje koje sjedinjuje jedinstvo i razdvajanje. Za razliku od povijesnog posredovanja, u kojem je moguće jedino prolazno tragičko pomirenje, tu se oba suprotna ne vraćaju k sebi tek u krajnjoj suprotstavljenosti, niti u odviše sjedinjenoj zamjeni, nego u takvom pomirenju u kojem se gubi svako prekomjerje i vlada istinska prisnost onog sjedinjenog.Die Geschichte ist bei Hölderlin als das Schicksal verstanden, wodurch der Geist sich aus seiner anfänglichen Vereinigung in seine Trennung schickt. Innerhalb des einheitlichen geschichtlichen Schicksaals unterscheiden sich besonders das griechische und das hesperische Schicksal, die aufeinander wesentlich hingewiesen sind. Das besondere Schicksal wird geschickt nach dem bestimmten Schicksalsgesetz, in Bezug auf den Zweck der Geschichte, d.h. auf die Entfernung und Nähe eines bestimmten Zeitalters von dem Ursprung der Geschichte.Die Geschichte ist in ihren besonderen Gestalten die Entwicklung des Ursprungs selbst. Indem der Ursprung sich in der Geschichte zeigt, verbirgt er sich in seiner Unendlichkeit und Unerschöpflichkeit, bis er in geschichtlichen Umwälzungen sich als solcher offenbart, wenn wieder eine neue geschichtliche Welt, eine neue besondere Wechselwirkung der Natur und Kunst hergestellt wird. Die Einheit wird nicht als die Rückkehr in die Unmittelbarkeit des ersten Zustands erzielt. Sie ist keine bloße Wiederholung der ersten Einheit, sondern ein solcher Zustand, der die Einheit und die Trennung vereinigt. Im Unterschied zu der geschichtlichen Vermittlung, in welcher allein die vorübergehende tragische Versöhnung möglich ist, kehren hier die beiden Gegensätze zu sich selbst, und zwar weder bloß in der äußersten Entgegensetzung, noch in allzu vereinigten Verwechslung, sondern in einer solchen Versöhnung, in der jede Übermäßigkeit verschwindet und die wahrhafte Innigkeit des Vereinigten herrscht. (shrink)

Review of: Embodiment, Relation, Community: A Continental Philosophy of Communication, Garnet Butchart (2019) University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 199 pp., ISBN 978-0-27108-325-4, h/bk, $80.95.

L’Epistola ad V. C. de Henry More ( Epistola H. Mori ad V.C. quae Apologiam complectitur pro Cartesio, quaeque introductionis loco esse poterit ad universam philosophiam cartesianam ), publiée plusieurs fois du vivant de More, a toujours été lue, par les commentateurs, essentiellement comme une étape, tout à fait centrale, dans l’histoire des relations de More à Descartes. C’est une thèse interprétative que je partage, mais à laquelle je voudrais essayer d’ajouter une perspective de lecture. Je voudrais montrer que l’Epistola, (...) si elle est considérée dans toutes les étapes de son histoire éditoriale, peut être lue, davantage que comme une étape, quoique capitale, comme un condensé de l’histoire du changement d’attitude de More par rapport à Descartes. En effet, l’histoire des péripéties éditoriales qui la caractérisent reproduit à petite échelle l’histoire complexe du rapport de More à la philosophie cartésienne et, en même temps, permet de mieux l’éclairer. (shrink)

Autorzy artykułu argumentują, że libertarianie (tacy jak Murray Rothbard, Stephan Kinsella), którzy jednocześnie podpisują się pod zasadą proporcjonalności w obronie własności prywatnej oraz pod poglądem, iż posiadanie prawa własności prywatnej oznacza posiadanie prawa do jej obrony, popadają tym samym w dylemat polegający na tym, iż jeżeli jedynym sposobem obrony prawa własności prywatnej jest jego nieproporcjonalna obrona, to to własności tej - wbrew temu, co ów pogląd głosi - nie towarzyszy prawo do jej obrony. Najlepiej uzasadnionym sposobem wyjścia z tego dylematu (...) jest osłabienie peremptoryjności praw własności prywatnej, czyli skonceptualizowanie tychże praw jako absolutnych jedynie w słabym sensie tego słowa (korzystając z dystynkcji zaproponowanej przez Matthew H. Kramera). Z kolei libertarianie, którzy tak jak Walter Block chcieliby wybrnąć z rzeczonego dylematu poprzez zastąpienie zasady proporcjonalności zasadą delikatności, popadają w innego rodzaju problemy (nieintuicyjność moralną czy ogólną niekoherencję), co jest tylko kolejnym argumentem na rzecz tezy, iż osłabienie wymogów praw własności prywatnej jest najlepiej uzasadnionym sposobem przezwyciężenia rozważanego tu dylematu. (shrink)

In “Models and Reality”, H. Putnam formulated his model-theoretic argument against “metaphysical realism”. The article proposes a meta-reconstruction of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument in the light of two mutually compatible interpretations of it–elaborated by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Igor van Douven. A critical reflection on these interpretations and their adequacy for Putnam’s argument allows us to expose new theses coherent with Putnam’s reasoning and indicate new paths to improve this argument for our reconstruction task. In particular, we show that Putnam’s position (...) may be coherent with van Douven’s versions of Global Descriptivism under some conditions, but Putnam cannot reject realism as quickly as Carpintero suggests. We show that Suszko’s canonic axiomatic system and Sneed’s concept of theory may provide valuable support for Putnam’s argument. Finally, we critically evaluate Carpintero’s theses about the genesis of unintended interpretations of our languages, adopting the machinery of the Upward Skolem–Loewenheim Theorem and Knight’s Theorem. (shrink)

It has seemed natural to model phenomena related to vagueness in terms of graded membership. However, so far no satisfactory answer has been given to the question of what graded membership is nor has any attempt been made to describe in detail a procedure for determining degrees of membership. We seek to remedy these lacunae by building on recent work on typicality and graded membership in cognitive science and combining some of the results obtained there with a version of the (...) conceptual spaces framework. (shrink)

Putnam’s internal realism is aimed at reconciling realist and antirealist intuitions about truth and the nature of reality. A common complaint about internal realism is that it has never been stated with due precision. This paper attempts to render the position precise by drawing on the literature on conceptual spaces as well as on earlier work of the authors on the notion of identity.

Miss G. E. M. Anscombe has said that, in order for progress to be made in ethics, we must have some determinate idea of ‘human flourishing.’ I want to cite in what follows the work of a number of writers in the psychiatric field who seem to me to throw light on just what it is for a human individual to flourish, for a human community to flourish, and for a human individual to flourish in relation to or in spite (...) of his community. (shrink)

Helmut Plesner’s philosophical anthropology introduces not only the division of the world of the living being into self and environment, but also a superstructure over the zip distribution: eccentric positionality. This reflexive ability of the self to relate to itself allows the formation of personal-relative, i.e., social life. The aim of the article is: to trace the possibilities of methodological renewal of sociotheoretical discourse, which opens for him the principle of eccentric positionality.The study uses historical-comparative and logical-analytical methods. Research results. (...) H. Plesner in the idea of eccentric positionality unfolds the perspective and possible practical consequences of the establishment of human openness in the world, not stopping at the danger of finally breaking the anthropological framework of his philosophy, dissolving it in the concept of personal socialization.Conclusion. Plesner’s «social» is presented as a life phenomenon – it is the highest manifestation of life, and the process of personalization of life manifestations is a process of socialization. Taking the self beyond oneself in eccentric positionality is something more than separating oneself from the environment, opposing oneself to it and establishing an attitude towards it. In the course of establishing the relation to oneself, the self does not form it automatically – the positioning of eccentricity cannot be carried out directly – which enables a special space favorable for the «inter-self» existence of living beings, a specific sphere of «inter-self» relations – the sphere of social existence. (shrink)